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Institute of Government and Public Affairs
Task Force on the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic has made being in crowds gravely risky, leading many to promote, encourage, or even demand increased use of absentee voting for the November 2020 
election. Illinois state government will not require voters to use 
absentee ballots, but it is nudging them in that direction by sending 
applications for mail-in ballots to everyone who voted in 2018, 2019, 
or the March 2020 primary.1 The fact that Illinois already permits 
early, in-person voting, absentee voting, and in-person Election Day 
voting contributed to the state’s high rating by the Brennan Center 
for Justice, in a recent report on state preparedness for the 2020 
election.2
Proponents of absentee voting 
(or voting “by mail” or “at home”) 
have often portrayed it as a pan-
acea, even before the pandemic 
made avoiding crowds so crit-
ical to public health. The Vote-
at-Home Institute, for example, 
promises that absentee voting is 
a “secure and time-tested way to 
put voters first,” that it “is fair and 
equitable for all communities,” 
and “has proven to be highly 
secure.”3 Allowing people to vote 
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at their own convenience can reduce the stress 
associated with lines and time pressure, and can 
reduce the costs of voting for those who find it 
difficult to make time go to the polls because of 
work, family, or transportation issues. Hence, it 
could, in theory, yield greater turnout and perhaps 
promote more thoughtful voting. 
Nonetheless, there are at least two obvious draw-
backs to removing the act of voting from the 
privacy of the curtained booth. First, voting by mail 
(VBM) is not inherently secret, unlike completing 
a ballot in a private booth. The United States first 
adopted secret ballots in the 19th century to re-
duce then-widespread voter coercion and fraud.6 
The shift away from secrecy represented by the 
increased use of absentee ballots has not been any 
group’s stated policy goal. However, as officials have 
prioritized convenience or access, they have been 
willing, quietly, to let secrecy go, with scant discus-
sion of the tradeoff. The secrecy of voting, even in 
a booth, is more at risk today with the ubiquity of 
miniature cameras. But, ultimately, mail-in ballots 
are easily cast without secrecy, whereas it requires 
some effort to break the secrecy of a booth vote.
Another potential problem with VBM is that errors 
and mistakes in processing are more likely and 
harder to rectify. An inherent risk with length-
ening the ballot “pipeline” by adding additional 
processing steps is that more ballots may be lost 
or miscast, not through malfeasance, but due to 
human and machine error. 
Some number of errors is inevitable when large 
bureaucracies process high volumes of work. Inter-
jecting one or two transmissions by the U.S. Postal 
Service between the request for a ballot and the 
tabulation of the completed ballot by election offi-
cials almost certainly increases error, but it is hard 
to know how much of this might occur. Moreover, 
with in-person voting, some mistakes may imme-
diately be caught and fixed, as when equipment is 
designed to alert voters to “undervotes” (contests 
without any, or with some threshold of choices 
made) or “overvotes” (too many choices). Such 
automatic error checks are far more difficult with 
VBM, and probably impossible for ballots arriving 
close to the deadline for receipt.
Some Voting-Method Terminology
Completing a ballot away from a private booth at an official site was 
traditionally labeled “absentee” voting. 
States that switched to exclusive use 
of such voting initially preferred the 
terminology “voting by mail,” or “VBM” 
for short, and, at first, did expect or 
require that ballots be mailed. Ironically, 
proponents now grant that a best 
practice might be for absentee ballots 
not to be returned by the U.S. Postal 
Service, because they don’t want their 
innovation in voting harnessed to an 
institution that shows signs of becoming 
obsolete. A rhetorical shift underway 
is to re-label absentee voting as “at-
home voting” even though the ballots 
can be filled out wherever the voter 
wants, whether at home, a coffee shop, 
on a subway, or in front of one’s boss at 
work. Submitting ballots online isn’t yet 
regarded as reliably secure, so the main 
alternatives to the mail are physical drop-
off stations and third-person collection.4 
The former option potentially reduces 
the convenience of absentee voting and, 
for present purposes, re-creates some 
risks of crowding and lines. The latter is 
prone to fraud and abuse, as the 2018 
North Carolina Ninth District U.S. House 
race well demonstrated, and it is illegal 
in Illinois.5 A special class of absentee 
votes are those cast by eligible voters 
overseas, including active-duty military 
personnel, their families, and other U.S. 
citizens living abroad. Since the passage 
of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act in 1986, these votes 
are subject to distinct rules as compared 
to the great majority of ballots, which 
are cast domestically. Hereafter, we 
mainly follow the new Illinois legislation 
and employ “mail” or “VBM” as our 
descriptors.
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How might these potential problems and oth-
er differences affect voters’ confidence in the 
election process and outcomes? Aside from 
whether voter fraud and error are worse with 
VBM or in-person voting, how would a significant 
change in the way many people vote affect voter 
confidence? One of the core sustaining elements 
of a strong democracy is a high degree of citizen 
confidence in the results of elections. Ideally, de-
feated candidates and their supporters concede in 
the knowledge that they were bested in a fair fight 
of ideas, with the hope that they may return to the 
fight and win another time. Without confidence in 
elections, people may fail to vote, become cynical, 
and refuse to accept defeat at the polls or in the 
legislature, because they regard elections as fixed.7
In this Policy Spotlight, we examine the potential 
impact of the pandemic-induced shift to VBM on 
voter confidence in Illinois’ election process for 
November 2020. Thirty-five states have changed 
their absentee or mail-in voting procedures in 
response to the pandemic.8 Do voters trust VBM? 
Our answer is “mostly yes, but not as much as 
they trust in-person voting.” We close with some 
suggestions that might help alleviate voters’ fears.
VOTER CONFIDENCE IN VOTING—
ELECTION DAY, EARLY VOTING, AND VBM
Table 1 shows results from national surveys field-
ed in 2012 and 2016. Voters were asked, “How 
confident are you that your vote in the General 
Election was counted as you intended?” This Sur-
vey of Performance of American Elections (SPAE) 
features large samples from every state (N=200 
for each state plus the District of Columbia), so 
it is especially useful for studying electoral rules 
that vary across states.9 Most states have made it 
possible for voters to choose at least one form of 
“convenience voting,” either early in-person vot-
ing or VBM, but the details vary a great deal. The 
states also differ substantially in how their ballots 
are now cast.10
Some good news in Table 1 is that the 2016 elec-
tion saw an increase in overall confidence among 
voters that their ballots were counted correctly, 
as against the prior presidential-election year. 
Furthermore, absentee voting had the highest 
jump, and its 2016 ratio of “very confident” to 
“not at all confident” or “not very confident” 
responses, at 9.2, was better than any of the 
comparable ratios for 2012. On the other hand, 
confidence in absentee voting continued to lag 
that for early voting and voting in-person on 
Election Day, with a lower “very confident” level 
and higher “not confident” level, for a worse ra-
tio. Compared to 2012, 2016 also saw more con-
venience voting, with early and absentee ballots 
each comprising about 20% of the respondents’ 
reported votes. Thus, the term “Election Day” is 
becoming obsolete, for better or worse. But note 
that early voting, comparable in usage level to 
Table 1: Confidence in own vote counting by vote mode, 2012 and 2016
2012 2016
Election Day Early Absentee (mail) Election Day Early Absentee (mail)
Very confident (VC) 64% 65% 55% 68% 68% 65%
Somewhat confident 24% 26% 31% 24% 23% 26%
Not confident (NC) 9% 8% 11% 6% 6% 7%
Don’t know 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3%
N (unweighted) 5,925 1,647 1,747 5,299 2,063 2,030
VC divided by NC 7.1 8.1 5.0 12.2 12.4 9.2
Top four rows are weighted percentages, with “not too confident” and “not at all confident” combined into one category. 
Weighting aims to estimate a nationally representative sample. The precise question in both the 2012 and 2016 SPAE was 
“How confident are you that your vote in the General Election was counted as you intended?” A chi-squared test rejects 
independence for the 2016 distribution, with p = 0.022. In other words, the confidence distributions for the three kinds of 
voters are not the same.
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absentee voting, is more like Election Day voting 
in regard to the confidence it inspires.
Are these gaps between confidence in voting mo-
dality evidence that voting method causes a given 
level of voter confidence? Not necessarily. Voters 
who are inclined to doubt the integrity of the 
electoral process may opt to vote absentee, such 
that their choice of voting modality is affected by 
their prior confidence, rather than the other way 
around. Causality might even run both ways. In 
any case, the association between confidence and 
modality is clear, if not the causal pathway. The 
gap is not huge, but it does appear that absentee 
voters have slightly lower confidence that their 
votes will be counted. This finding should concern 
Illinois election officials in the current effort to 
encourage VBM.
One might also wonder if absentee voters are less 
confident mainly (or only) where VBM is unusual 
and unfamiliar, and not where it is widely used. 
Table 2 shows that there may be a grain of truth 
in this conjecture, but that the confidence gap 
is, nonetheless, robust. We separated the nine 
states with the highest levels of absentee voting 
in 2016—the (nearly) all-VBM states of Oregon, 
Washington and Colorado, plus Arizona, Utah, 
California, Montana, Hawaii, and Iowa—and com-
pared these to the remaining states (plus the Dis-
trict of Columbia) in regard to the ratio of “very 
confident” to not confident responses, explained 
above.11
Because only 156 people in the nine high-absen-
tee-share states reported in-person, early voting, 
we combined the two in-person modes for that 
row. The lowest ratio, representing the least confi-
dence, occurs for absentee voters in the 41 states 
and the District of Columbia where it is less com-
mon. But the second-lowest value is found among 
absentee voters in the states where VBM is the 
norm. Confidence is uniformly higher for voters 
who cast their ballots in person.
The debate over voting methods in the U.S. has 
recently become somewhat entangled with par-
tisanship. Conservatives and Republicans mainly 
emphasize the dangers of absentee voting, focus-
ing on ballot security and integrity, while Dem-
ocrats and liberals laud the innovation, stressing 
convenience and more equal access. Today’s GOP 
skepticism about VBM, led by President Trump, is a 
shift, given that the reform was originally a Repub-
lican effort in the mid-20th century to increase 
A Few Lessons from the Primaries
In due course, political scientists will likely study the differences across state prima-
ries in 2020 unusually closely, since pan-
demic-induced restrictions were imposed 
by state and local governments midway 
through the extended primary season. On 
March 17, Illinois held its primary as con-
cerns about COVID-19 spread were rapidly 
growing, but just before officials settled 
on widespread stay-at-home orders as a 
necessary precaution. The election proved 
to be mainly unremarkable. Wisconsin was 
the unusual state not to delay or move 
completely to VBM a primary scheduled in 
April or May. Its April 7 election was some-
what chaotic, proving that a late surge in 
demand for absentee ballots can easily 
overwhelm capacity, and that reducing 
the number of polling stations drastically 
while demand for in-person voting remains 
high is a recipe for long waits. Whether 
the election caused a spike in COVID-19 
cases remained unclear as of this writing.12 
Turnout in Wisconsin did not notably drop 
from its 2016 primary and in several states 
that voted later, turnout appears to have 
risen dramatically, even where lines were 
long and other logistical problems acute.13







High (>40%) absentee (N=9) 12.2 10.3
Low (<40%) absentee (N=42) 14.1 13.7 9.0
Here, we condition by state traits (absentee-voting level) and compute ratios from unweighted frequencies. 
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military and older voters’ participation.14 Table 1 is 
a “bivariate” result, not accounting for ideology 
or party. Could it be that the apparent association 
between lower confidence and separation from 
polling stations is due to those on the right tend-
ing to be both more suspicious of absentee voting 
and, perversely, more inclined to engage in it? In 
a statistical analysis also assessing the effect of 
respondents’ self-identified ideology on their con-
fidence, the finding persists: absentee voters are 
less confident that their ballots count, compared to 
voters using the other two methods. So, the (small) 
confidence curse of absentee voting is not merely 
a spurious result of ideological variation.
The 2012 SPAE data also demonstrate a small, 
but discernible association of higher beliefs in 
fraud in states with more absentee voting.15 Table 
3 shows one sign that, in 2016, there was likewise 
a penalty for VBM. The SPAE asked respondents 
about six kinds of fraud. In Table 3, we show only 
the percentages that chose the “very common” 
response, again separating the nine states with 
very high absentee-voting levels from the other 
42 jurisdictions. 
The terminology of the responses offered is 
inherently ambiguous—exactly what such terms 
as “very common” and “infrequently” mean is left 
to the respondent, and people probably vary a 
good deal in how they understand them. In turn, 
it is hard to say what is a disturbingly high level of 
belief in any kind of fraud. We simply compare the 
aggregate responses for states with quite high 
levels of absentee voting to all the rest, without 
imposing any judgment about what constitutes a 
desirable baseline. 
The first three columns in Table 3 reveal that voters 
in states with more absentee voting were a little 
more likely to say that some kinds of fraud (those 
that, arguably, are easier to commit when voting is 
done away from supervision) were very common. 
In the table, bold text designates items where the 
difference reaches conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Beliefs about votes illegally being cast 
by non-citizens, shown in the second column, are 
surely sensitive to perceptions of the size of the 
non-citizen population in the state. California is 
estimated to have the highest resident alien pop-
ulation, but the other eight high-absentee states 
are not uniformly high in this regard, so the gap in 
percentages believing that it is very common for 
non-citizens to vote is probably not spurious.16
The final column shows that voters in high-absen-
tee states have slightly higher faith that official 
vote counters are not corrupt, which should 
please vote-at-home advocates. But the reasons 
to fear votes being cast away from secure booths 
do not really involve fraudulent tabulation, so that 
item is perhaps inapt for assessing voter confi-
dence in the vote-casting method. 
Finally, there is some ambiguity in comparing 
beliefs about voter impersonation. Column 5 of 
Table 3 shows higher levels of belief that absen-
tee impersonation is very common in high-VBM 
states than elsewhere (8.3% versus 7.2%). But 
that gap might arise because people recognize 
that absentee voting itself is very common, rather 
than because they think it is especially prone to 
fraud. Comparing across columns 4 and 5, rath-
er than across the rows in each column, is thus 
a useful check. In the high-VBM states, 8.3% say 



















(>40%) 6.2 11.9 5.5 5.6 8.3 4.8
Low absentee (42)
(<40%) 5.5 10.2 4.9 6.1 7.2 5.0
Column labels are shorthand for: “People voting more than once in an election”; “People voting who are not U.S. citizens”; 
“People stealing or tampering with ballots that have been voted”; “People pretending to be someone else when going to vote”; 
“People voting an absentee ballot intended for another person”; “Officials changing the reported vote count in a way that is not 
a true reflection of the ballots that were actually counted.” Entries are percentages computed from unweighted frequencies. For 
formal two-sided difference-of-proportion tests, p-values are: 0.32 (multiple); 0.04 (non-citizen); 0.29 (tampering); and 0.80 
(tally). Across column comparisons for impersonation are: 0.00 (high-absentee states) and 0.00 (low-absentee jurisdictions).
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Any Evidence of Absentee-Vote Fraud?
In the debate about how safe and se-cure is absentee voting, exaggeration is 
common on both sides. President Trump’s 
recent comments that “mail-in ballots 
are a very dangerous thing … subject 
to massive fraud”17 could be defended 
as strictly true given the “subject to” 
language. But the risks are likely margin-
al rather than “massive.” Proponents of 
absentee voting, meanwhile, commonly 
strain credulity by denying that non-se-
cret voting is any more vulnerable to 
fraud or coercion than secret voting, or 
that fraud is “nearly non-existent.”18 A 
popular approach is to quote seeming-
ly exact statistics, as when Washington 
State’s Director of Elections, Lori Augino, 
asserts, “Of the nearly 3.2 million ballots 
cast [in Washington in 2018], only 0.004% 
of the total ballots cast may have been 
fraudulent,” based on her experience veri-
fying signatures.19 Again, “may have been” 
in lieu of “were” rescues the argument 
from being strictly wrong, but it is mis-
leading to imply that the state conducts a 
complete audit to validate all ballots.
Our focus in this Policy Spotlight is subjec-
tive belief about error and fraud, rather than 
the roles of political rhetoric or real-world 
events in creating such beliefs. But some 
election fraud certainly takes place, and 
there are reasons to doubt that reported or 
litigated cases constitute the full universe.
One of us (Gaines) served as an expert 
witness in a vote-fraud case in southern 
Illinois in 2000. Illinois made absentee 
voting easier in 2009, with Public Act 
096-0553, but it was possible to cast an 
absentee ballot even before that. In the 
2000 Democratic primary race for Circuit 
Clerk in Alexander County, Sharon McGin-
ness narrowly defeated incumbent Susan 
Hileman, 1,299 to 1,089. But days before 
the primary, “a police raid confiscated 681 
absentee ballots for the upcoming primary 
from the home, office, and truck of County 
Clerk Louis Maze ... along with ... evidence 
suggesting that Maze was opening the 
absentee ballots and replacing those in 
favor of Hileman with ballots cast in favor 
of her opponent.”20 Hileman sued and the 
ensuing case, Susan C. Hileman v. Sharon 
McGinness and Louis Maze (Circuit Court 
of Alexander County, No. 2000-MR-24), 
featured jaw-dropping testimony. One 
observer recalls, “…more than a dozen 
witnesses testified that they were paid $3 
each, and in some instances were given a 
pack of cigarettes or half-pint of whiskey, 
to cast votes for specific candidates. ... 
Perhaps even more telling ... was testimo-
ny during the trial about political slush 
funds funneled through a Cairo union hall, 
voter intimidation by felons and reports of 
rampant absentee voting fraud.”21 Gaines’ 
statistical analysis of the abnormality of 
the voting patterns was largely super-
fluous with so much direct evidence of 
cheating. The judge declared the result 
void and the office vacated. However, 
the Alexander County Democrat Central 
Committee promptly appointed McGin-
ness back to the position. As noted by a 
veteran southern Illinois journalist, “…more 
unbelievable is the fact that the attorney 
general, state board of elections and the 
state police all investigated the 2000 pri-
mary election and still nothing happened. 
No indictments, no arrests, nothing.”22 The 
case offers a clear rebuttal to the argu-
ments sometimes put forward by defend-
ers of absentee voting that there cannot 
be much undetected fraud because losing 
victims always have incentives to seek 
judicial remedies, and that the fairly small 
number of convictions demonstrates that 
fraud is exceedingly rare.
that absentee impersonation is very common, but 
only 5.6 % think in-person impersonation is very 
common. Where VBM is rarer, the percentages 
saying that absentee and in-person impersonation 
are very common are 7.2 and 6.1, respectively. So 
more people in both kinds of state perceive ab-
sentee impersonation as very common than think 
its in-person equivalent is very common.
None of the evidence above is conclusive proof 
that absentee voting erodes voter trust in elections 
to a dangerous degree. The differences are consis-
tent, but small, and, as table notes reveal, not all of 
the comparison reach conventional levels of statis-
tical significance. We have not here attempted to 
estimate full models of all of the factors shaping 
voters’ subjective assessments of election fairness. 
Voters have a high level of trust all forms of 
voting, but they have slightly less confidence in 
VBM, which reflects the additional risks inherent 
in VBM. Given those concerns and the pandemic 
conditions we are in, election authorities need to 
take immediate steps help to alleviate the con-
cerns that voters will have in November.
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR NOVEMBER 2020
As Illinois officials encourage more VBM in No-
vember 2020, for fully understandable and 
defensible public-health reasons, they should 
strive to counter any suspicions that the shift 
may raise about elections being rigged or flawed. 
Accordingly, we close with a short list of practical 
measures that could help mitigate the potential 
skepticism about the fairness of an election in 
which many more ballots are completed away 
from polling stations.
•  Promote and explain VBM: State and local offi-
cials should waste no time in explaining the de-
tails of absentee voting to Illinois voters, includ-
ing the rationale for promoting its use. Officials 
cannot assume that all voters will understand 
why their VBM application shows up in the mail 
or even that they know what VBM is. Extensive 
public outreach by election officials will need to 
be done before any ballot applications are sent, 
and then through the VBM voting period, per-
haps in cooperation with various civic groups.
•  Warn voters of delays with Election Day vot-
ing: As part of election authorities’ promotion-
al efforts, voters must be warned that due to 
COVID-19 precautions, Election Day could see 
high waiting times for voting and fewer polling 
stations. Such warnings serve two purposes. 
First, Election Day voters will be prepared, rath-
er than shocked and discouraged, if the voting 
process is unusually time-consuming. Second, 
it may encourage more voters to request and 
use a VBM ballot, or to vote early at an official 
polling place, further reducing COVID-19 risks.
•  Prepare the polling places: Even with expand-
ed VBM, local election officials must still serve 
those who wish to vote in person. In Novem-
ber 2020, this means preparing polling places 
to deal with the pandemic. Exactly uniform 
procedures for cleaning equipment, spacing 
booths, and so on are less important than 
serious efforts everywhere to do the best job 
possible given local constraints. Early planning, 
leadership from the State Board of Elections, 
and cross-county cooperation will help ensure 
safety for in-person voters. Planning logistics is 
critical to ensuring voter confidence on Elec-
tion Day, and there is still time to prepare.
•  Caution voters that results may be slow 
coming in: Illinois voters and news media must 
also be prepared for not all election results 
being known on election night. The contests 
not resolved (“called”) until many days after 
Election Day are typically a few close races 
plus others that are ultimately not necessar-
ily close, but that took place in a jurisdiction 
with many late-arriving ballots, such as Cal-
ifornia.23 For example, note that the June 23 
Democratic Senate primary in Kentucky was 
finally called seven days later, on June 30, be-
cause of a large number of absentee votes.24 
Election officials, of course, need to do what 
they can to prepare for the expected flood of 
mail-in ballots in November, including hiring 
more staff, buying high-speed ballot counters, 
developing procedures and systems for bal-
lot verification, and so forth. But Illinois law 
stipulates that mailed-in ballots that arrive 
after Election Day, if postmarked no later than 
that day (the Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November, this year November 3), be counted 
along with provisional ballots.25 When VBM 
was a small percentage of the total votes, 
as in past Illinois elections, only the tightest 
races would hinge on those votes, so most 
races could be called on election night. But in 
November, the increased percentage of mail-in 
ballots received may mean that many races 
will not be decided for days after the elec-
tion. Preparing the pubic in advance for some 
delay could go a long way toward discourag-
ing complaints and conspiracy theories and 
toward encouraging voter confidence.
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•  Prevent vote harvesting: Many documented 
or alleged cases of VBM fraud involve voters 
giving control of their ballots to someone other 
than an election official or postal worker. Illinois 
does not permit anyone other than the individ-
ual voter to return a completed absentee ballot, 
except when the voter has formally authorized 
another individual to do so.26 Officials should 
clarify and publicize these rules against “vote 
harvesting” and strive to ensure that any viola-
tions will be resolved in a uniform manner.
•  Use new election law to secure an adequate 
number of polling places: A new law for the 
2020 election closes all schools on Election Day 
and authorizes election authorities to use school 
buildings as polling places. Schools are widely 
distributed through communities and have large 
spaces that can provide safe polling places to 
replace facilities such as nursing homes, which 
have been used in prior elections.27 
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